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BIOTERRORISM-RELATED ANTHRAX

Laboratory Response
to Anthrax Bioterrorism,
New York City, 2001
Michael B. Heller,* Michel L. Bunning,† Martin E.B. France,‡ Debra M. Niemeyer,§
Leonard Peruski, ¶Tim Naimi,† Phillip M. Talboy,† Patrick H. Murray,# Harald W. Pietz,†
John Kornblum,* William Oleszko,* Sara T. Beatrice,* Joint Microbiological Rapid
Response Team,1 and New York City Anthrax Investigation Working Group2
In October 2001, the greater New York City Metropolitan Area was the scene of a bioterrorism attack. The
scale of the public response to this attack was not foreseen and threatened to overwhelm the Bioterrorism
Response Laboratory’s (BTRL) ability to process and test environmental samples. In a joint effort with the
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention and the cooperation of the Department of Defense, a massive
effort was launched to maintain and sustain the laboratory response and return test results in a timely
fashion. This effort was largely successful. The development and expansion of the facility are described,
as are the special needs of a BTRL. The establishment of a Laboratory Bioterrorism Command Center and
protocols for sample intake, processing, reporting, security, testing, staffing, and quality control are also
described.

L

aboratories across the United States have been preparing
for the past 5 years for the possibility of civilian populations being the target of bioterrorism (1). The New York City
(NYC) Department of Health (DOH) laboratory response
plans for bioterrorism changed forever after October 12, 2001,
with the knowledge that letters laden with Bacillus anthracis
spores had been sent through the U. S. Postal Service (2). The
original conception of the laboratory’s role in bioterrorism
response was not yet fully validated, nor was the need for
extensive environmental testing fully appreciated or anticipated. The number of personnel with specialized training was
another key factor.
The most probable scenario envisioned a sharp increase in
hospital admissions caused by one of the recognized bioterrorism agents (3). By the time the symptoms and bioterrorism
agent were diagnosed, the disease was likely to be well established within the local population. Thus, laboratory response
would center primarily on human clinical sampling. The scope
of required environmental sampling was not fully anticipated
and was generally considered to be secondary to the original
epidemiologic investigation. Such samples would predominantly consist of evidence obtained from the putative source of
the exposure.
Although this was the operational scenario, the actual laboratory workload during this event was evenly divided
between environmental and clinical samples. However, the

amount of labor and materials associated with processing environmental samples for analysis far exceeded that of the clinical
samples.
Background: Laboratory Structure
before October 2001
Before October 12, the NYC Public Health Laboratory
(PHL) processed one or two suspected bioterrorism environmental samples per month, utilizing a small Biosafety Level 2
(BSL-2) room with two dedicated personnel. In the year
before the attack, the PHL received approximately 10 samples,
all of which were hoaxes. The laboratory was set up according
to Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) protocols, and staff were trained by CDC on methods for isolating
and identifying bioterrorism agents.
The bioterrorism laboratory consisted of a 400–square-foot
area designed at BSL-2+ as described in Biosafety in Microbi1The

*New York City Department of Health, New York, New York, USA;
†Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, Atlanta, Georgia, USA;
‡Warfighting Concepts and Architecture Integration Division (J-8), The
Joint Staff, Washington, D.C., USA; §Joint Program Office for Biological
Defense, Falls Church, Virginia, USA; ¶Naval Medical Research Center, Silver Spring, Maryland, USA; and #Seymour Johnson Air Force
Base, Goldsboro, North Carolina, USA

Joint Microbiological Rapid Response Team consisted of the Biological Defense Research Directorate, Naval Medical Research Center,
Bethesda, Maryland: F. Baluyot, M. Boyd, and T. Hudson; 4th Medical
Support Squadron, Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, North Carolina,
USA: L. M. Bayquen and L. Galloway; and 7th Medical Support Squadron, Dyess Air Force Base, Texas: L. De Los Santos and C. Sekula.
2
The New York City Anthrax Investigation Working Group consisted of
Division of Vector-Borne Infectious Diseases, Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Fort Collins: May Chu, David Dennis, Kathleen Julian, Anthony A. Marfin, and Lyle Petersen; CDC, Atlanta: Mary
Brandt, Richard Kanwal, Kristy Kubota, Els Mathieu, Steve Ostroff,
John Painter, Dejana Selenic, Allison Stock, Linda Weigel, and William
Wong; New York City Department of Health: Neal Cohen, Laura Mascuch, Denis Nash, Sarah Perl, and Don Weiss; New York City Public
Health Laboratories: Alice Agasan, Jay Amurao, Josephine Atamian,
Debra Cook, Erica DeBernardo, Adeleh Ebrahimzadeh, Philomena
Fleckenstein, Anne Marie Incalicchio, John Kornblum, Ed Lee, William
Oleszko, Lynn Paynter, Alexander Ramon, Chiminyan Sathyakumar,
Harold Smalls, George Williams, Marie T. Wong, and Ben Y. Zhao.
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ological and Biomedical Laboratories (4). Entrance to the laboratory was controlled by proximity card access and monitored
24 hours a day by video cameras. The space contained a biosafety cabinet, a fluorescence/phase-contrast microscope, incubators, freezers and refrigerators, a Wallach/Perkin Elmer
Victor Time Resolved Fluorescence instrument (The PerkinElmer Corp., Norwalk, CN), computers, and necessary laboratory supplies. This configuration provided a comfortable and
controlled access space for sample preparation and analysis.
Because of the low sample volume, each sample was treated
uniquely, and a generalized method for handling numbers of
environmental specimens was not considered necessary.
Before October 12, all specimens submitted to NYC
BTRL were tested for four priority bioterrorism agents: B.
anthracis (anthrax), Francisella tularensis (tularemia), Yersinia pestis (plague), and Brucella species (brucellosis). Protocols defined and validated by CDC were used to isolate and
identify these agents (5). All specimens tested during that time
were culture negative for the four priority bioterrorism agents
according to the validated protocols.
October 12: First Letter Tested Positive
Before B. anthracis was identified in letter C from media
outlet 1, two other letters (A and B) were received and tested
by BTRL. Letter A came from media outlet 1, and letter B
came from media outlet 2. Letters A and B were tested for the
four priority bioterrorism agents and were negative. At the
time, the negative result for letter A was somewhat surprising
because the patient diagnosed with cutaneous anthrax was
employed by media outlet 1. When letter C later arrived at
BTRL, it was tested and found to contain a powdery substance
that was positively identified as spores of B. anthracis. The
discrepancy involving the positive results of letters A and C
was soon resolved when it was determined that letter C was
actually received before letter A at media outlet 1 but was
inadvertently placed in a corporate “hate-mail” file and was
thus recovered after letter A.
A number of important events took place almost simultaneously after letter C tested positive for B. anthracis: 1) the
BTRL was contaminated with B. anthracis spores during the
sampling process and three BTRL laboratory employees were
exposed; 2) the news media and the U.S. Attorney General
broadcast a message to Americans asking them to report all
suspicious mail to their local law enforcement authorities (6);
and 3) as a result of this increased attention, the sample volume surged and did not abate for another 6 weeks.
These events worked synergistically to complicate NYC
DOH’s ability to contend with bioterrorism testing on the scale
needed during this crisis. At this time, CDC contacted NYC
DOH to offer support and aid. On learning of the situation
developing in NYC and the events surrounding the contamination of BTRL, including exposure of employees, the PHL, in
conjunction with CDC, instituted several important policies:
1) A Bioterrorism Response Laboratory Command Center was
established at PHL to direct and coordinate all bioterrorism
Emerging Infectious Diseases

laboratory activities and communications; 2) A secure and
separate entryway was set up so bioterrorism specimens could
enter the PHL building without jeopardizing the safety of PHL
building personnel; 3) A separate specimen-receiving area
containing a decontamination site was established, and all
specimens were double bagged and externally decontaminated
(sprayed with a bleach solution) before being brought to the
testing laboratory for analysis; 4) All environmental bioterrorism specimens were tested by using strict and secure BSL-3
containment and BSL-3 protocols; 5) BTRL personnel
exposed in the contaminated laboratory were treated with
ciprofloxacin HCl; 6) Extensive infection control and environmental monitoring procedures were set up throughout the PHL
building to monitor for B. anthracis spores; 7) Security was
extensively increased throughout the building’s interior and
exterior; 8) During the transition to the new BSL-3 testing
facility, samples received for bioterrorism testing were shipped
to offsite level C laboratories for analysis; 9) A dedicated database was developed for accepting and tracking bioterrorism
specimens and testing results; and 10) CDC and NYC DOH
requested a Department of Defense (DOD) Microbiology
Response Team to assist with rapid testing of bioterrorism
specimens.
After the initial evaluation, the NYC PHL facility was configured to operate 24 hours a day, accepting, processing, and
testing samples. Additional laboratory space was identified,
consisting of three separate areas for handling and testing bioterrorism samples (two polymerase chain reaction [PCR] units
and an enzyme immunoassay [EIA] rapid screening unit). The
BTRL coordinator was also appointed to work in conjunction
with CDC and DOD teams. Staffs from other units were also
redeployed to further assist in the bioterrorism response effort.
Post–October 12: The Bioterrorism
Response Laboratory
Within days of the initial event on October 12, all the
essential elements of BTRL were in place. Table 1 describes
the transition before and after October 12. Both the types of
laboratory activities and their scale changed dramatically. The
sample volume increased approximately 3,000 times for both
environmental and clinical testing. Not surprisingly, the number of laboratories and ancillary spaces BTRL required
increased almost twentyfold, and 25 times more personnel
than originally envisioned staffed these additional areas. New
instrumentation (i.e., the PCR rapid assays) was brought into
BTRL to attempt to process the sample volume more quickly.
To supply this dramatic surge, six tons of equipment and supplies was needed. The scale of the operation and the tracking
needs threatened to overwhelm the support staff, and a hastily
constructed but workable database system was put into place.
This sample volume surge was expected to be specimens
of human origin (clinical specimens); the need for large-scale
environmental sampling and testing had not been anticipated.
The clinical laboratories experienced exponential increases in
volume but had enough latent capacity to handle the increased
• Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002
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Table 1. Comparison of the New York City Bioterrorism Response Laboratory requirements before and after October 12, 2001a,b

Specimen load
Laboratory space

Staff
Technology
Supplies
Miscellaneous

Before October 12, 2001

After the surge of specimens

1 every 2–3 months

2,700 nasal swabs/2 weeks
3,200 environmental specimens/2 months

One room

10 laboratories
3 evidence rooms
4 support areas
Command center (suite of offices)
Separate storage area for supplies

2 people rotating on call schedule

>75c

Basic microbiology capabilities
γ phage DFA

Rapid PCR assays with conventional basic
microbiology capabilities

General laboratory supplies

6 tons flown to NYC from CDC

No database
1 stand-alone computer

Clinical database
Environmental database
30 computers linking all areas of the building

a
When the first letter tested positive for spores of Bacillus anthracis was received.
b
PCR, polymerase chain reaction; DFA, direct fluorescent antibody assay; CDC, Centers for Disease Control
cFrom the NYC Public Health Laboratory, CDC, NYC Department of Health, and Department of Defense.

and Prevention; NYC, New York City.

workload. Increases in coverage and overtime, plus additional
reagents, sufficed to contain the testing volume within manageable limits. Clinical sample processing and tracking were
not adversely affected, but environmental sampling was
severely hampered. The original testing laboratory was never
designed to handle more than perhaps a few samples per day.
On the first day of the surge, the laboratory received 34 samples that were considered high priority (Figure 1). Figure 2
shows the flow of a sample as it enters the BTRL. The laboratory can be divided into three main functional entities: 1) a
receiving area, which contains a decontamination site in processing area and a secured temporary storage facility; 2) two
sampling areas (one each of BSL-2 and BSL-3), containing
facilities to unwrap and examine environmental samples and
retrieve samples for further analysis (BSL-3), clinical microbiology laboratories, and the PCR laboratories; and 3) locked
and guarded storage for samples that had completed the testing
protocol and were ready for subsequent distribution as waste,
returnable property, or evidence.
Bioterrorism Response Laboratory: Units,
Operation, and Staffing
Samples were tracked through the system by a specially
designed database that reflected the testing status of the sample and its final report status. A large portion of the database
was devoted to description and demographics (Figure 3). Table
2 shows a section of a typical spreadsheet.
All environmental samples entered the building through
the designated bioterrorism intake area. The main function of
this area was to provide decontamination, documentation, and
security. Samples would be accepted only from designated
first responders and law enforcement personnel. Although
standard protocols now ensure that the samples brought in for
laboratory testing are not externally contaminated with a bioterrorism agent (7), as a prudent preventive measure the outer

1098
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Figure 1. Depiction of the algorithm used to determine the priority of
items received for testing at the New York City Bioterrorism Response
Laboratory. One of the salient features of the surge was the broad array
of items that the laboratory received for testing. Many items contained
innocuous powdery substances that are now known to be unrelated to
the attack, yet prudent practices required that they be ruled out. The
laboratory needed to identify which items were the most urgent and
place them first and used this algorithm and other triage methods to prioritize the samples. Samples with 8 out of 11 points or greater were
deemed STAT for “highest priority for laboratory testing” and received
preferential treatment. Most samples fell into a middle category and
were processed in order based on time received.
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4) rapid testing, where the EIA and PCR-based systems were
employed, designed to quickly yield preliminary data in
advance of the classical microbiology final report.
Storage

After a sample was tested, it was sequestered in a safe,
secure area. Samples testing positive for a bioterrorism agent
were stored in a specifically designated, locked storage area
separate from the negative samples. All negative samples once
recorded were handed over to NYPD, where the items were
screened for evidentiary purposes. Items not considered evidence were autoclaved and returned to their owners, if valuable. Otherwise, they were discarded. NYPD maintained a log
of all transactions and signed off the final disposition on the
chain-of-custody form completing the case.
Laboratory Operation

After a sample passed through the intake area, it either
entered the BSL-3 testing area or proceeded as a clinical sample or swab directly into the clinical microbiology unit. Swabs

Figure 2. Diagrammatic tracking of an environmental sample through
the various units and laboratories as it was processed and tested for
anthrax at the New York City Bioterrorism Response Laboratory. The
first level of the diagram corresponds to the first floor or the sample
intake area. Samples were moved via an elevator to the upper floors of
the facility, where they were processed and tested. The final destination of all samples was the storage area. Storage was also a locked
and guarded forensic evidence room, and samples released from this
area after testing negative for Bacillus anthracis were released to the
New York Police Department for criminal investigation, return, or disposal.

packaging still needed to be decontaminated in the intake area.
A breach in any procedure could compromise the laboratory.
Chain-of-custody documentation was maintained in the
intake unit as well as initial entry into the database. All packages came with a test request/manifest document with the data
entered and manually maintained at the intake area. Security
(provided by NYC DOH Police Department) were present in
the area continuously. After passing through decontamination
and receiving, packages were held in a nearby temporary storage area until requested by the sampling or testing laboratories.
Analytical Units

The analytical laboratory was composed of four units: 1)
high-containment examination area (BSL-3), where all environmental samples suspected of containing dispersible powders were examined and sampled for further testing; 2) BSL-2
laboratory, for environmental swabs; 3) clinical microbiology,
for receiving clinical swabs and analyzing tissue samples; and
Emerging Infectious Diseases

Figure 3. Depiction of the data flow at the New York City Bioterrorism
Response Laboratory adopted soon after the surge of isolates after the
bioterrorism attack. An access database was developed, and a number
of demographic fields and test results were identified and entered. Data
retrieved from the Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory after suspicious
packages were opened had to be input into the database; the original
documentation was modified if any additional information was identified.
An attempt was made to monitor all transactions occurring to the sample, which began to make the system unwieldy. The database was modified numerous times and recently was entirely replaced. Most of the
comments, such as “no place in database” have been corrected. PCR,
polymerase chain reaction; DOD, Department of Defense; HHA, handheld analysis; DFA, direct fluorescent-antibody assay; OEM, Office of
Emergency Management.
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Table 2. A sample section of the data table generated by the tracking system diagramed in Figure 3a,b
Site addressc

Pick-up date

Intake date

Item description

Testing location

Urgency

Comments

Swab taken?

FBI

10/9/2001

10/9/2001

Envelope (Westchester County)

NYCPHL

Hospital A

10/10/2001

10/10/2001

Blood culture

NYCPHL

Stat

No

Hospital B

10/8/2001

10/10/2001

Request for bacterial culture identification

NYCPHL

Stat

No

FBI

10/10/2001

10/10/2001

Petri dish

NYCPHL

10/11/2001

One express-mail envelope sealed in
plastic, addressed to United Nations

NYCPHL

High

NYPD

No

No
No

FBI

10/11/2001

10/11/2001

Plastic bag with white powder;
business card.

Wadsworth

Low

not enough
info

No

FBI

10/11/2001

10/11/2001

Plastic bag containing one envelope with
white powder.

Wadsworth

Low

not enough
info

No

a

From left to right are fields for responder or site of response, site address, date of pick-up, date of intake, bag contents, location of testing, comments, priority, swab taken (yes, no),
and patient (if clinical sample). This database allowed the managers to check the progress of sampling and keep track of the “who, what, where, and when” of the samples.
Federal Bureau of Investigation; NYCPHL, New York City Public Health Laboratory; NYPD, New York City Police Department; Stat, highest priority for laboratory testing.
Masked for security purposes.

b FBI,
c

taken from letters, powders, objects, clothes, and other items
in the high containment BSL-3 area were plated directly on
sheep blood agar (SBA) or transferred onto brain heart infusion broth (BHIB) and incubated there. Another set of samples
was taken for rapid testing. These PCR samples were brought
out of the containment area and sent to the rapid testing units
in separate sample bags decontaminated with a recommended
hypochlorite solution (4).
On completion of sampling, the specimen was removed
from the biosafety cabinet and taken to the evidence storage
area. This procedure posed a problem since it is recommended
that items leaving the BSL-3 area be fully decontaminated.
Since steam sterilization or chemical decontamination might
destroy valuable evidence, the finished items were placed into
sterile biohazard bags that remained uncontaminated on the
outside. This newly packaged sample was then removed to the
evidence storage area.

At the peak of the surge, BTRL was testing 60–100 samples per 24-hour shift. Each sample required, at a minimum,
duplicate PCR and an SBA culture. Any growth required the

Testing Protocols and Reporting Algorithm

All testing protocols were adapted from established protocols (8). In short, samples were analyzed by using a rapid
screening assay (PCR) to provide preliminary information to
health-care providers and law enforcement. However, final
disposition of samples was only made after exhaustive identification according to recommended microbiology protocols.
Figure 4 outlines the workflow through the analytical
units. Clinical samples were generally directly plated onto
SBA. The environmental samples often were simultaneously
transferred into BHIB and heat shocked to kill nonsporulating
organisms and enrich for B. anthracis spores. A sample was
reported as positive only if it had all the following phenotypes:
nonmotile; penicillin sensitive; γ-phage positive; and positive
by both cell wall and capsule direct fluorescent-antibody
assay. Extensive environmental monitoring was performed on
the reports before they were released. All negative clinical
reports were compiled into a manifest and sent to the Mayor’s
Office of Emergency Management, where they were distributed to the appropriate parties.

Figure 4. Chart tracking the time needed to report the status of a sample brought in for classical Bacillus anthracis testing at the New York
Bioterrorism Response Laboratory. Negative samples with no suspicious growth could be reported in 24 hours. However, any samples with
growth required some degree of subplating or culturing in brain heart
infusion broth (BHIB), were heat shocked, and then tested. Reporting
of final results on samples could take 3–4 days. SBA, sheep blood
agar; CW, cell wall; CAP, capsule; DFA, direct fluorescent-antibody
assay; PCR, polymerase chain reaction; Ph, phage; +, positive.
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phenotypic testing described above. Most samples were also
transferred to BHIB; growth in that medium required phenotypic analysis. The average sample, even if it resulted in a negative finding, required at least 14 separate testing procedures
to determine its status.
Processing specimens sampled in the BSL-3 required 30–
60 minutes and limited the flow to the microbiology laboratories. Despite any effort to speed testing through the microbiology laboratories, the limiting factor remained the maximal
BSL-3 throughput of approximately 40 samples per 24 hours.
Biosafety and Environmental Monitoring

Normal operations within a clinical microbiology laboratory require routine infection control and quarterly environmental monitoring (9). Because of the experience of October
12 when one laboratory was contaminated, hypervigilance was
required to prevent the possibility of further contamination.
Our concerns were not only for safety but also for the integrity
of the testing process, as stray contamination could seriously
mitigate the reliability of the laboratories results.
We instituted a schedule of infection control environmental monitoring. Typical areas that would signal contamination
such as door handles, laboratory benches, and hoods, in addition to exposed skin of technical personnel, were routinely
sampled each day. Approximately 70 data points were routinely sampled from the various bioterrorism units around the
facility, including the intake area, elevators to the BSL-3, the
BSL-3 (all three shifts), microbiology laboratories, PCR laboratories, and all personnel associated with operations. Additional areas sampled frequently were the storage room and
various corridors in the facility.
Laboratory Staffing

With minor variations, the PHL had a fully functional
BTRL running 24 hours a day, 7 days a week within the first
week. Approximately 75 personnel from DOH, CDC, DOD,
and other organizations were split evenly between two shifts
per day. Scheduling was further complicated because DOH
personnel had to be borrowed from other testing units and
could not be dedicated to the bioterrorism effort alone.
Staffing during the surge consisted of DOH personnel
along with the CDC emergency team. The DOD Microbiology
Rapid Response Team that supported testing in the microbiology and BSL-3 sampling unit filled a number of slots. The
DOD was also completely responsible for the rapid testing
units.
A unique aspect of the staffing requirements for BTRL
was the need for extensive security. The DOH Police Department carried out this function. Officers were present in the
intake area and guarded the sensitive testing and storage areas
around the clock. They were responsible for maintaining the
chain of custody and for initial intake of information after the
first response units brought samples to the laboratory. In addition, officers increased all aspects of security for the building
with extensive identification (ID) checks, closed circuit televiEmerging Infectious Diseases

sion surveillance, and maintenance of ID cards. Essentially,
the DOH Police Department continuously monitored all personnel movement in the facility.
Physical Security

Physical security concerns became paramount because
samples brought to the BTRL were also potential criminal evidence and therefore required special precautions (e.g., chain of
custody, locked or guarded storage areas) to protect their integrity. To accomplish these security goals, the DOH Police
Department augmented laboratory security by increased background investigation of personnel, extensive implementation
of physical security procedures, and oversight of laboratory
accessions and evidence containment. The DOH Police
Department investigated unusual work practices, breaches of
confidentiality, and safety issues with an eye to possible lapses
in security.
Physical security was enhanced by the use of ID cards,
restricted area badges, and a sign-in logbook. Only one
entrance was open to the public, while another entrance was
designated for bioterrorism sample accession. Card access was
instituted for all sensitive areas such as the testing laboratories
and the evidence room. This system allowed for tracking of
users and limiting such use to specific personnel at specific
times. All card and badge access was tracked. All entrances,
elevators, emergency exits, and sensitive laboratories were
monitored continuously by closed-circuit television, and all
transactions were recorded.
The use of biological, chemical, or radiologic materials
with the intent of causing injury or death is a crime, and the
instrument used and swabs or specimens obtained from the
crime scene are potentially evidence (10). The DOH Police
Department maintained responsibility for accepting and storing proper evidence to maintain its integrity as it was transferred from law enforcement into the laboratory for testing.
Custody containment, which ensured the integrity of the evidence for prosecution, was also maintained by the DOH Police
Department.
Conclusion
The events of September 11, 2001, placed New York City
on high alert immediately (11). On the heels of this tragedy,
the City became the target of a bioterrorism attack (12). NYC
DOH, as part of the city’s emergency response network, was
extensively involved with the mitigation of both these catastrophes. The laboratory had recent experience in public health
emergencies such as the West Nile virus outbreak (13) and the
1999 bottled-water scare.
Although PHL had chain-of-custody experience through
its Toxicology and Environmental Laboratories and outbreak
testing during the West Nile outbreak, nothing could have prepared the laboratory for the events of October 2001. Nevertheless, staff outfitted the laboratory within days to accept, test,
report, store, and return data or evidence from literally thousands of environmental and clinical samples tested for anthrax.
• Vol. 8, No. 10, October 2002
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In the months after the crisis, BTRL still receives about
five suspicious samples per week. Samples are now routinely
tested for the four priority agents, and plans have been finalized for dedicated laboratory space designed by using the lessons learned from October 2001.
Nevertheless, before October 2001, we thought we were
prepared to confront an event on the scale of this bioterrorism
attack. An important lesson from this experience is that,
despite all additional precautions and enhancements made to
the laboratory and the response network, another attack, if and
when it occurs, will present further surprises. While the laboratory has now institutionalized weapons of mass destruction
testing to be performed as part of routine surveillance (e.g.,
testing of drinking water), potential means and targets for
future attacks cannot be perfectly forecast. Vigilance and continued emphasis on flexibility, creativity, and the ability to rapidly expand our response, as needed, to bioterrorism events
and the surprises they present will determine our effectiveness
and ultimate success.
We appreciate the efforts and support of the Surgeon General and
their staffs of the U.S. Air Force and Navy.
Dr. Heller is the director of the General Toxicology and Environmental Science Laboratory and the Office of Safety and Health, New
York City Department of Health, and a member of the Bioterrrorism
Response Team. His research interests include the membrane structure of influenza virus.
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